Abstract
Introduction
Optical barcodes have found many application areas in today's society. The RFID technology [1] provides identification conveniently without requiring a line-of-sight and thus becomes an interesting alternative to barcodes and also plays a role in new application areas.
The technology has much potential to make life more comfortable and to provide huge savings due to increased productivity. But on the other hand, there are various requirements regarding security and privacy protection that need to be addressed properly.
Some examples shall illustrate the problems. RFID tags called "Verichip" are sold to identify people, e.g. for controlling access to high security areas. Such chips can be implanted to bind them to the legitimate bearers. As shown by Halamka et al. [2] , the chips can be cloned easily. Therefore, they should not be used if security matters. Other problems exist regarding privacy. If RFID tags were affixed to most everyday items (this is the vision) and RFID readers became widespread, privacy implications would arise. For instance, one could learn the contents of a woman's bag or of one's purse just by passing by with a mobile reader. This would give information about privacy sensitive items, e.g. pharmaceuticals, books, the amount of money a person carries etc. Another fear is that RFID tags in personal items, e.g. wristwatches, glasses, shoes etc, could be abused for recognizing or even tracking the respective bearer. The collected data could be used for customer profiling and for surveillance purposes.
Ideally, one could use the benefits of RFID systems without suffering from security and privacy implications. This paper thus intends to advance current solutions to come closer to that goal.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the main high-level goals regarding security and privacy in RFID systems are identified. One can derive the tasks that RFID protocols need to perform. Related work is then stated in section 3. The focus is put on the "Hash-based ID variation" approach and the "Hash chain" approach because the new proposal called "Triggered Hash Chains" presented in section 4 combines concepts of these two approaches. In section 5, the proposal is evaluated before the paper concludes with a summary.
Goals regarding security and privacy
Some examples regarding security and privacy issues have been presented in the introduction. By analyzing such scenarios, five goals that RFID systems should reach can be identified. They are depicted in figure 1 and explained in the following. [12] Maintain data security. Illegitimate reading of data must be prevented in RFID systems because the data may be privacy sensitive. The simplest way of reaching that goal is to move all data from tags into the backend infrastructure. If the tags only have an identifier with random appearance and all associated data is securely stored in the backend, one has no hassle in preventing unwanted reading. As there are no tight resource restrictions in the backend like in tags, one can implement flexible access control schemes there. Further, one can access and modify the associated data without the tag being in the read range of a reader. All RFID protocols for low-cost RFID (including the ones presented in this paper) thus presume that all data is stored in the backend infrastructure.
Cope with denial-of-service. This goal is directly connected to the availability of RFID systems. Even if attackers try to put a system out of service, ideally the system should keep running and provide service to legitimate users. A prerequisite is that the integrity of the system is preserved. As it is not possible to prevent all kinds of denial-ofservice attacks (e.g. shielding tags with a Faraday cage), RFID systems should at least provide means to cope with denial-of-service attacks, e.g. by implementing means for detection of malicious actions and recovering from them. The RFID protocols presented in this paper are designed in such a way that no additional vulnerabilities are introduced by them.
Prevent counterfeiting. For many applications, preventing counterfeiting is a goal that should outweigh the higher cost of RFID compared to optical barcodes, which can be copied easily. If RFID tags only emit unique numbers for identification, they can be copied or mimicked easily. But with RFID tags that can prove their genuineness, counterfeiting can be prevented effectively. Such RFID tags can then be used for security sensitive applications like for granting access to restricted areas.
Prevent illegitimate access. Illegitimate access to system components enables the infiltration of false data. Thus, it is essential to ensure that only data from trusted sources is processed. Preventing illegitimate access is thus a prerequisite for ensuring the integrity of the data in an RFID system. Prevent unwanted recognition and tracking. Recognition and tracking of objects are core functionalities of RFID systems. They are relevant in all supply chain applications. But if persons get involved, that functionality is often no longer a wanted one for privacy reasons. There is thus a severe conflict that needs to be solved: Sometimes the functionality of recognition and tracking is wanted and sometimes not. There need to be technically implemented models to provide a suitable trade-off.
Based on the presented system-level goals, one can identify the following three tasks that an RFID protocol needs to perform: identification, authentication, and identifier modification.
Identification is the main purpose of an RFID system and thus needs to be provided by any RFID protocol. This is done in practice by assigning a unique identifier to each tag.
Authentication is used for preventing counterfeiting and for preventing illegitimate access to backend systems. If tags are able to prove their identity, they cannot be copied easily and one can be sure that the data they provide is valid.
Identifier modification is used to prevent unwanted recognition and tracking. As a static identifier can be used by anybody for recognition and tracking, the idea is to change the tag identifier regularly. This is done in such a way that only the legitimate backend entity can recognize it. Of course, as discussed in the "maintain data security" paragraph, there may not be any additional public data on a tag that could be used for unwanted recognition and tracking.
Related work
Identification is provided by all RFID systems. Authentication and identifier modification are optional tasks that can be implemented by RFID protocols to reach the goals corresponding to that tasks.
A variety of RFID protocols has been proposed in the literature. Avoine maintains a website that aims at listing all relevant works regarding security and privacy in RFID systems [3] . Already more than 170 works are listed there currently, but only few of them provide new, innovative concepts.
This section does not aim at repeating a presentation, comparison, or evaluation of the published approaches. Such tasks are, for example, already performed in [4] with focus on authentication and for more general approaches in [5] . In the following, two RFID protocols that are relevant for the approach proposed in section 4 are discussed.
"Hash-based ID variation" approach
The "Hash-based ID variation" approach was proposed in [6] . It implements all the three main tasks, i.e. identification, authentication, and identifier modification.
Each tag stores a 3-tuple: an internal tag identifier ID, a session number t, and the number of the last successfully completed session t last . The backend entity in charge of a tag needs to store two records for each tag in a tag database. Each record requires a field for the hashed internal tag identifier h(ID), the internal tag identifier ID, the current session number t, the number of the last successfully completed session t last , and a pointer ptr to the respective other record. Initially, the variables in tag and backend entity are in sync, and t equals t last .
The protocol operates as shown in figure 2 . After receiving a request, the tag increases its current session number t by one and calculates Δt as the difference of t and t last . Then the tag replies with the hashed internal tag identifier h(ID), a hash value h(t, ID) for authenticating the tag, and the calculated Δt to give the backend entity a hint for calculating t.
Using the received h(ID) and the tag database, the backend entity can identify the tag. Using Δt and the t last from the database record, the current session number t of the tag can be recovered. If that t is not current or checking the received hash value h(t, ID) is wrong, the message is discarded and no further processing takes place. Otherwise, the session number t of both database records is updated. Furthermore, the t last of the second record is updated; a random number r is picked; a reply message is sent; and the ID and h(ID) of the second record are updated. The tag receives the random number r and a hash value h(r, t, ID) that authenticates the backend entity and ensures the integrity of r. If the received hash value is correct, the tag updates its internal tag identifier ID and its last successfully completed session number t last correspondingly to the backend entity. Otherwise, the tag takes no action.
Within this protocol, the backend entity stores two records for each tag to become able to cope with message loss. If the last message does not reach the tag, either by coincidence or caused by an attacker, the tag can still be identified using the record with the old tag identifier.
More detailed information regarding the protocol along with an example and a security analysis can be found in the original publication [6] .
Identification takes place using the tag identifier h(ID). Due to the identifier modification, the h(ID) changes after each successfully completed protocol cycle. Authentication is performed using hash values with the internal tag identifier ID (that is never revealed to the outside world) as preimage. The session numbers thwart replay attacks. By using Δt instead of t, it is avoided that the tag becomes recognizable by t. The random number r provides information how to change the tag identifier. Without knowing the current tag identifier, an attacker cannot calculate the new one, even if he overhears r. The scheme provides limited forward secrecy: Old identifiers can only be determined by an attacker if he obtains the current ID, e.g. by physical extraction, and has overheard all previous random numbers r.
Care needs to be taken in compressing the preimages of the hash functions. One may not use a xor operator to do so, since in that case backend entity and tag can be brought out-of-sync, see [5] . But no actual weaknesses have yet been found concerning the protocol concept itself.
Despite the good security characteristics, the approach also has some drawbacks. Reader and backend database are usually in different locations of the network. For the protocol cycle to succeed, the tag must remain powered-up, i.e. it must stay in the range of the reader until the reply message from the backend entity could be forwarded to the tag. Second, the Δt is on the one hand a nifty solution but can on the other hand also be regarded as a "hack" being not very elegant.
"Hash chain" approach
Ohkubo et al. proposed to modify tag identifiers using hash chains [7] . It implements two of the three tasks, i.e. identification and identifier modification. Authentication is not provided since replay of messages is not prevented by the protocol. [12] Like in the previously described approach, each tag has a tag identifier ID that is never revealed to the outside world, and the hash value g(ID) is used as the identifier for identification. But in contrast to the previous approach, the identifier update is not triggered by the backend entity. Instead, the identifier modification is performed by the tag itself without requiring interaction with the outside world. The tag organization is depicted in figure 3 . Figure 4 shows a complete protocol cycle. After a request from the reader, the RFID tag replies with a hash value g(ID) and updates its tag identifier ID by applying the function f. This ensures that the tag will give out another identifier at the next query.
The backend entity has stored the initial tag identifiers ID 0 of the tags it is in charge of and tries to identify the tag by the received g(ID). Therefore, the backend entity needs to iteratively apply the function f to all ID 0 until g (ID n+1 ) matches the received g(ID) or a terminating condition is reached. The backend entity does not need to send a reply message to the tag. The function f should have a uniformly distributed output. If it also has the one-way property of a cryptographic hash function, the scheme provides forward secrecy: Even if an identifier ID is revealed to an attacker at some time, he cannot obtain previous tag identifiers. If a hash function is used for f, it needs to be different to the hash function g for the approach to be secure. Instead of implementing two distinct hash functions, one can use one function with different initialization vectors or add a second preimage that is different in each case; see [8] for more information upon hash functions.
From a security and privacy perspective, the approach has very good characteristics. Furthermore, it is elegant since tags only need to store a single variable and only need to perform a single hash calculation per tag query.
The main problem of the approach is that the backend entity needs to perform many iterations of hashing to all stored tag identifiers before a tag can be identified. The reason is that lost messages or tag queries by an attacker bring the two peers outof-sync so that the backend entity does not know which value to expect.
When the number of iterations on the backend side is limited by policy, an attacker can render a tag unidentifiable by enough repeated queries. If no limit is applied, an attacker can run a denial-ofservice attack against the backend entity by inserting an invalid tag identifier into the system. A solution is to introduce a limit of iterations that a tag performs before it starts over with ID 0 . But then identifiers repeat. This could be abused by an attacker for unwanted recognition and tracking.
In any case, the approach is not well scalable since many hash operations are required to identify a single tag. The complexity is O(n²), whereby n is the number of tags known to the backend entity. Optimizations discussed in the literature like Avoine's "time-memory trade-off" [9] mitigate the problem to some extent but do not solve it. Thus, the approach cannot be used in practice, but it is a good conceptual base for creating other protocols.
A further disadvantage is that the approach does not perform authentication of the tag (and the backend). An attacker could query a tag multiple times and replay the answers to the backend entity later in the same sequence. This way, an attacker can mimic the tag. For example, the approach can thus not be used as an anti-theft protection for high-value items because an attacker can pretend that a tag is still in place albeit it no longer is.
"Triggered hash chains"
In this section, the "Hash-based ID variation" and the "Hash chain" approach are used to create a scheme called "Triggered hash chains". The goal is to have a scheme that has the same desirable properties as hash-based ID variation like the ability for performing authentication but without the inelegant Δt and the resulting issues. The hash chain concept is used to reach this goal.
Introduction to "Triggered hash chains"
The basic idea is to perform an update of the inner tag state using a hash function like in the hash chain approach. But in contrast to that approach, an update is not performed on each tag query but only when triggered by the backend entity in charge of the tag.
The notation in the following description is as follows: Variables are written in capital letters, the current values of the variables in lower case. Figure 5 depicts the tag organization for the new approach. The tag has an inner state ID that is never revealed to the outside world. The backend entity which is in charge of the tag knows the current inner state id. [12] The current tag identifier is calculated by applying the hash function g, i.e. by calculating extid = g(id). As the backend entity knows the inner state of the tag and can also calculate g(id), the backend entity can identify the tag successfully.
The inner state ID is updated by a (hash) function f like in the hash chain approach. The update is not performed on each tag query, but only if the tag receives a message that contains the hash value h(id), whereby h is another hash function. figure 6 . After a request, the tag sends g(id) to the backend entity. Using its tag database, the backend entity can identify the tag and obtain the current inner state id of the tag.
The backend entity now attempts to trigger an update of the inner tag state. Therefore, the backend entity calculates updauth = h(id) using the hash function h and sends the result via the reader back to the tag.
The tag calculates h(id), too. If the result and the received value match, the inner state of the tag is updated by calculating id ← f(id). No modification of the inner state takes place in the other case, and the received message is discarded by the tag. The function f needs not have the one-way property of a hash function for the scheme to operate, but a hash function provides forward secrecy.
In analogy to the hash-based ID variation approach, the backend entity always keeps two records for each tag in its tag database. If an update message gets lost, the backend entity can therewith still identify the tag using the old tag identifier. Like in the hash-based ID variation approach, both records point to each other and the respective unused record gets overwritten by an update. [12] A variant of the approach is shown in figure 7 . Instead of having two different hash functions g and h, only one hash function h is employed in a slightly different setup. The hash function is applied twice to calculate the tag identifier, i.e. extid = h(h(id)). In the next step, the backend entity returns updauth = h(id) to trigger the update of the inner tag state. The possibility to calculate extid when updauth is given is no insecurity because the tag identifier extid was revealed to the outside world before anyway.
Figure 7. "Triggered hash chain" variant

Example and protocol analysis
In this section an example of the protocol operation is presented. Afterwards the susceptibility of the protocol regarding message loss, message interception, and replay attacks is analyzed. The different cases are illustrated with examples.
A usual synced state between a tag and its backend entity is depicted in table 1. The tag only has a single state variable, i.e. the internal tag identifier ID. This internal identifier has a value of id in the example. The backend entity has a database with a table for keeping data regarding its tags. The table has hash values g(ID) as table keys and also has an ID field for the internal tag identifier and a PTR field for pointing to related records. This is similar to the organization in the hashbased ID variation approach, but the session number fields are not required here. The tag table contains two records for each tag. One record belongs to the current tag state. This is the record with g(id) as table key, id as internal tag identifier and the pointer to the second record. That second record contains the data belonging to the previous tag state. This data is kept for the case of message loss, just like in the hash-based ID variation approach.
Regular tag query. In a successful protocol run, the tag is queried and yields extid = g(id) as tag identifier. The backend entity can identify the tag by the corresponding record entry in the database. If not already done, the backend entity overwrites the second record with f(id) as internal tag identifier and g(f(id)) as tag identifier or table key, respectively. Afterwards, the backend entity sends updauth = h(id) back to the tag. The tag compares the received updauth with its calculated h(id) and updates the internal tag identifier by calculating id ← f(id) if both values match. The resulting state in tag and database is depicted in table 2.
Table 2. State after regular update
Backend entity
First message lost or intercepted. The first message of a protocol cycle transports the current tag identifier from the tag to the backend entity. This message can get lost due to an error, or an attacker can prevent the message from being delivered. The message loss itself does not cause any harm because neither tag nor backend entity have changed their state due to the tag query. Three cases can be distinguished for the whereabouts of the first message:
· Message is never inserted again. · Attacker inserts message again before a successful protocol cycle between tag and legitimate entity occurred. · Attacker inserts message again after a successful protocol cycle between tag and legitimate entity occurred. The first case, in which the message with the tag identifier is never inserted again, is uninteresting because the tag state did not change due to sending the message. With respect to state information, loss of the message is thus transparent for the tag as well as the backend entity.
The second case, in which the message is inserted again before an answer from the backend entity reaches the tag, leads to the creation of messages with the same content in succeeding tag queries. This can lead to several messages containing the same tag identifier reaching the backend entity. Upon the first reception of such a message, the backend entity updates the record with the tag identifier that has not been used for identifying the tag. This is the intended behavior within the normal protocol operation. When a message with the same content reaches the backend entity again, no change of the backend state occurs any more.
The third case is the most interesting one because it has itself three cases that need to be distinguished. The completion of the protocol cycle causes the tag state to be updated so that a new tag identifier is emitted by the tag in the future. If the old, intercepted message reaches the backend before a message with such a new tag identifier has reached the tag, there is no difference to the previously described case: The old message does not cause a state change at the backend entity. In the second case, in which the old message reaches the backend after the new identifier has reached the backend, again no state change in the backend occurs. The backend will only reply with a message triggering an update of the tag state that has already been performed so that this reply message gets discarded by the tag. A third case is the insertion of the old message after two protocol cycles have been completed successfully. As the backend database always contains a record with the current and one with the previous tag identifier, the tag identifier contained in the old message is no longer known to the backend entity. Hence, the old message is discarded by the backend entity and no other action is performed.
Second message lost or intercepted. The second message is the one sent from the backend entity back to the tag to trigger the identifier modification. This message can get lost either by an error or by malicious attacker activity.
Table 3. State after loss of 2nd message
Tag ID id Table 3 shows the state in the tag and the backend after loss of the second message. As one can see, one record in the backend got updated upon reception of the first message. But as the second message got lost, no update of the internal tag identifier took place. Again, the already stated three cases can be distinguished for the whereabouts of the second message.
If the message is never inserted again, the tag keeps its current internal tag identifier. Hence, the tag will provide the same tag identifier again in the next tag query. The corresponding message will reach the backend entity and the tag will be identified using that old tag identifier. As the update of the second record has already taken place, the backend state will not change any more caused by the reception of an identical message. The backend will create a second message identical to the lost one. This can be regarded as a retransmission. For this retransmitted second message, the same three cases as described here hold.
The second case is the insertion of the message before another protocol cycle between tag and legitimate entity is completed. The inserted old message will trigger the intended update of the internal tag identifier. Compared to the regular protocol operation, the later insertion of the second message therewith results just in a delay. If in the meantime the tag has been queried again, the backend entity will send an identical message as reply to the tag. This message will be discarded by the tag since the identifier modification triggered by the included hash value has then already been performed before.
If the message is delivered to the tag after successful completion of another protocol cycle, the message is discarded by the tag. The reason is that a duplicate of that message has thus reached the tag earlier so that the identifier modification triggered by that message has already taken place. The message will thus not match the one expected to trigger another update and is discarded.
Evaluation
In this section, the triggered hash chain protocol is evaluated. Not all of the criteria shown here are commonly used in the literature. But all of them are regarded to be important for a fair and practically usable comparison to other approaches.
Security. The triggered hash chain protocol meats the security goals similarly to the hashbased ID variation protocol. Data security is maintained by keeping data associated to the tag in the backend. Counterfeiting is prevented by keeping an inner tag state so that the tag cannot be cloned. A secure tag authentication that excludes the possibility of a replay attack can be performed by querying the tag twice: The first read identifies the tag. The second read is used to ensure that a complete protocol cycle has been performed. Then the tag reveals a new tag identifier. As it is based on the inner tag state, the ability to provide this new identifier authenticates the tag. Illegitimate access to the system can be prevented in the same way by only treating identification data as valid after secure tag authentication. Unwanted recognition and tracking is prevented by identifier modification. Only the legitimate backend entity has the required information to identify a tag by its tag identifier after a performed identifier change. Attacks that lead to a denial-of-service are prevented by protocol design: As shown previously, attacks like message interception or replay attacks cannot bring tag and backend entity out-of-sync to thus disturb proper system operation.
Regarding additional properties, the triggered hash chain protocol is advantageous. Forward secrecy can easily be provided by implementing the function f using a hash function. Further, the only inner tag state that needs to be kept is the internal tag state ID. This lessens complexity compared to the hash-based ID variation protocol so that the triggered hash chain protocol can be expected to be less vulnerable to attacks and to be easier to implement. As a state change in the tag can only be triggered by an appropriate message that just the backend entity can craft, an attacker cannot enforce a state change for using such a state transition for attacks. In contrast, each tag query causes a tag to change its state in the hash-based ID variation protocol so that an attacker gets a lot of data and has more possibilities for attacks. Just like the hash-based ID variation protocol, the triggered hash chain protocol does not share secrets among several tags. Hence, the incentive for an attacker to perform advanced attacks like physical extraction of secrets is low. 
Resources.
A comparison regarding memory use, required computation, and amount of data exchanged in communications is shown in table 4 in the style of the protocol comparisons made in [10] . The size L denotes the size of a single variable in the comparison of memory use and the comparison of the amount of data. The computational effort H denotes the effort for a hash operation. Effort for other operations can be neglected. The values in brackets at the tag storage indicate the memory requirement if precalulation (see below in the performance paragraph for more information) is performed.
As it can be seen, the triggered hash chain approach outperforms the hash-based ID variation approach in all disciplines. Albeit uninteresting for practical application, the pure hash chain concept is also shown in the table as a reference. It requires one hash operation less than the new triggered hash chain protocol in the tags but is impractical in the backend.
Performance. As shown in table 4, in the triggered hash chain protocol, resource consumption is lower than in the other protocols. This leads to very good performance: Tags can be queried and their tag identifiers modified comparatively fast because not much data needs to be transmitted and only few hash calculations need to be performed at each peer.
As shown in the table, precalculation is possible in all the protocols. This means that hash operations can be performed in idle times before actually requiring the result. The result of these hash operations is then cached until it is needed and can then be readily delivered without delay. This is advantageous regarding speed of reading. In practice, one will thus probably spend additional memory for such caching.
Sustainability. With a slight extension, the triggered hash chain protocol can use different hash functions simultaneously: A tag is identified by the backend entity by the tag identifier, i.e. a hash value calculated using an arbitrary hash function. Now the backend entity needs to have an additional field in its database that denotes which hash function to use for the respective tag. This way, the required hash operations can be performed with the hash function that matches the one implemented in the tag. The ability to use different hash functions in parallel provides a migration path to newer, more secure hash algorithms.
A broken cryptographic primitive gives an attacker control that he would normally not have. In the worst case, the attacker could bring tag and backend out-of-sync and could get the ability to clone tags. Due to the lower complexity of the triggered hash chain protocol compared to the hash-based ID variation protocol, there is probably less target area for attacks. As there are no shared secrets amongst tags, the impact of a revealed inner tag state is restricted to a single tag.
Handling/practicability. The operation of the hash-based ID variation protocol and the triggered hash chain protocol is quite similar. For instance, alternative channels like a physical contact are not used in both protocols so that no user interaction is required. But the better performance of the triggered hash chain protocol improves handling because operations are finished in a shorter time.
In the hash-based ID variation protocol, tags need to stay powered between the tag query and the delivery of the reply message originating from the backend entity. Otherwise, the reply would be discarded by the tag since the session number is no longer valid after powering the tag again. This is different in the triggered hash chain protocol: A tag can be queried and the communication with the backend entity can be performed in the background without the tag being online. The reply message can be cached by the reader or reading entity, respectively, and be delivered directly after the next query of the tag. This way, a high speed of reading, which is for instance required at bandconveyors, can be obtained. This makes the triggered hash chain protocol much more practical than many other protocols.
Scalability, universality, and scope. Regarding these criteria, the triggered hash chain approach is very similar to the hash-based ID variation approach. As stated in the security evaluation, the identifier modification needs to take place on every tag query. Thus, a central backend entity is required so that each reader can forward the message received from the tag to it. Such a central entity is not desirable from a scalability point of view. A decentralized solution that enables load sharing among many machines at different locations is preferable [12] . None of the protocols shown here has such a feature.
All the protocols discussed in this paper are application independent and can thus be used in any application scenario. After identification of the tag, the backend entity can perform application specific action and arbitrary data can be associated to the tag in the database.
Summary and research directions
After introducing the topic, the goals that RFID systems should reach regarding security and privacy have been presented. These are: maintaining data security, preventing counterfeiting, preventing illegitimate access, preventing unwanted recognition and tracking, and coping with denial of service. One can derive that RFID protocols need to provide mechanisms for identification, authentication, and identifier modification.
Afterwards, the "Hash-based ID variation" approach and the "Hash chain" approach were discussed as related work. Both protocols provide identification and identifier modification but only the first one also authentication. The mechanisms underlying the two protocols are different: Whereas hash-based ID variation requires a message exchange to modify the tag identifier, the hash chain approach uses a self-refreshment concept.
By combining concepts of these two very different protocols, the "Triggered hash chain" approach has been created. The resulting approach joins the advantages of both protocols and is thus a good alternative to the hash-based ID variation approach.
Both have the same scope of application. But compared to the hash-based ID variation approach, the protocol presented here is more elegant: It is less complex, requires less memory in tag and backend, and has smaller messages. It also allows tags to get offline while the reader communicates with the backend entity in charge of the tag. This is a huge improvement regarding practicability.
The "Triggered hash chain" approach has been analyzed and compared to its predecessors. An evaluation has been performed using a variety of criteria. This includes criteria that are relevant in practice but that are often not found in the literature. The evaluation showed that the new approach has very good characteristics.
Further research on RFID protocols needs to extend the RFID system model: In practice, there are not only tags, readers, and tag owners (called backend entity in this paper). Instead, there is a complex interplay of different actors along the supply chains: tag bearers, subcontractors, service providers, etc. with different requirements and interests so that advanced characteristics like the ability for delegation (see [11] ) are very important and need further consideration [12] .
